“Top leaders in Africa favor not just their ethnic communities, but also the elites who can help them stay in power.”
— Dongil Lee

In African politics, it's long been assumed that presidents channel government resources to communities of their own ethnicity to reward political loyalty. But ethnic favoritism may not stop with voters. What if elites from the president's ethnic group—especially Members of Parliament (MPs)—are also central to how resources get distributed? After all, these elites hold sway in their local communities and can help presidents build lasting coalitions.

This study investigates that very question in Malawi, where ethnic identity plays a prominent role in electoral politics. Using detailed data on foreign aid disbursement across constituencies from 1999 to 2010, it finds strong evidence that presidents don’t just favor coethnic voters. They also direct significantly more resources to areas represented by coethnic MPs—even when those MPs serve areas with few coethnic voters.

Why coethnic elites matter

The logic is simple: coethnic MPs are more than representatives. They act as intermediaries who connect presidents to traditional and religious leaders at the local level. These local leaders can, in turn, influence voting patterns. By supporting coethnic MPs, presidents secure a reliable network for electoral mobilization and message control.

Crucially, these MPs aren’t just effective; they’re loyal. In 2005, when Malawi's president broke from his ruling party to form a new one, coethnic MPs were significantly more likely to follow him across party lines—despite the risks. Their ethnic alignment, it seems, went hand-in-hand with personal allegiance.

Mixed targeting in action

The study shows that the most aid-rich constituencies were those represented by MPs of the same ethnicity as the president—even after controlling for whether the area had many coethnic voters. Constituencies with coethnic MPs received 13% to 75% more aid per capita than others, depending on the presidential term.

This is evidence of a "mixed targeting" strategy: presidents reward both their ethnic voter base and their ethnic elite allies. Previous research has mostly focused on voters, overlooking the role that elite intermediaries play in distributing state resources.

How the researchers tested it

The researcher combined data from Malawi’s parliamentary elections (1999, 2004, 2009) with subnational, geocoded foreign aid disbursement records from 30 donor agencies. Although aid isn't a state resource in theory, it's often treated like one by leaders who have influence over where it goes.

To isolate the effects of ethnicity, the study compared changes in aid allocation before and after elections where coethnic MPs either gained or lost office. These difference-in-differences analyses were performed separately for each administration, with multiple robustness checks to ensure results weren’t driven by unrelated factors.

“Coethnic elites aren’t just more loyal — they’re better positioned to deliver votes. That makes them indispensable to top leaders.”

What it means for future aid

If donors and development agencies want aid to be distributed equitably, they may need to reckon with the political logic behind elite targeting. Presidents aren’t just using resources to shore up votes; they’re building networks of loyalists in Parliament who can amplify their power and deliver grassroots support.

These findings also raise concerns about accountability. If aid disbursement depends not on need but on the ethnic identity of MPs, then communities outside the ruling coalition may be systematically disadvantaged—even within the same country. Understanding these dynamics is crucial to improving the fairness and effectiveness of development aid.

About the Paper

Title: Targeting coethnic voters, elites, or both? Evidence from aid allocation in Malawi
Author: Dongil Lee
Publication status:World Development, Volume 188 (2025), 106907
Data: Malawi parliamentary elections and geocoded aid data from 30 donors (1999–2010)
Design highlights: Difference-in-differences analysis with constituency fixed effects, matched samples, and regime-specific estimates to isolate effects of MP ethnicity on aid allocation